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Resumo. Este artigo trata do processo de abolição do tráfico atlântico de escravos em 
Angola na primeira metade do século XIX. O artigo considera as diferenças e dinâmicas 
regionais do tráfico em Luanda, Benguela e o chamado “norte de Angola” (Cabinda e 
Ambriz). Argumenta que para entender o impacto das políticas abolicionistas em Angola, 
é preciso primeiro analisar questões como o provimento de escravos para a costa angolana, 
a participação das elites locais no tráfico e os laços estreitos entre Angola e Brasil. O artigo 
demonstra que as políticas abolicionistas só se tornaram efetivas quando Portugal aderiu 
à causa abolicionista na década de 1840 e com as operações navais que terminaram com 
os embarques de escravos em Luanda, o maior porto do tráfico de escravos em Angola. 
Como consequência do fim do tráfico em Luanda, os riscos associados com o tráfico 
aumentaram e o tráfico de escravos se tornou ainda mais concentrado em regiões fora 
do controle Português em Cabinda e Ambriz.
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Abstract. Th is article deals with the process of abolishing the transatlantic slave trade 
in Angola in the fi rst half of the nineteenth century. It breaks down the Angolan slave 
trade into three macro-regions: Luanda, Benguela, and “northern Angola” (Cabinda and 
Ambriz). It argues that in order to understand the impact of abolitionism on the ground, 
scholars need to take into account local conditions, such as the supply of slaves to the 
coast, the participation of local elites in the business of slaving, and Angola’s close ties 
to Brazil. Th e article demonstrates that abolitionism policies only became eff ective with 
the participation of Portugal in the 1840s and the naval operations that ended shipments 
of slaves from Luanda, the largest slave port in Angola. Th is development signifi cantly 
increased risks associated with the Angolan slave trade and provided further momentum 
to the process of spread of shipments of slaves to other parts of the Angolan coast.
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Approximately one million three hundred thousand 
Africans were taken to the Americas between the 1830s 
and the 1860s - the last three decades of the slave trade. 
By then most of the slave trade focused on Central Africa 
and the number of African regions shipping signifi cant 
numbers of slaves to the Americas was fewer than it had 
been in the eighteenth century. Embarkations of slaves from 
Senegambia were already relatively small and decreased 
further in the last decades of the slave trade. On the Gold 
Coast, the British withdrawal from Atlantic slaving, in 
1807, had an immediate impact on slave exports. In the 
Bight of Benin and the Bight of Biafra, exports continued 
until the 1840s and 1850s, but were signifi cantly aff ected
by the rise of attempts to suppress the trade. Unsurpris-
ingly, by the mid-nineteenth century, Angola and Kongo 
accounted for approximately 50 percent of all enslaved 
Africans taken across the Atlantic (Eltis, 2001, p. 24).
Th e changes sketched out above have been primarily 
related to infl uences external to Africa - particularly eff orts 
to halt the trade (Lovejoy and Richardson, 1995). In Lu-
anda, suppressive measures clearly comprised a paramount 
force behind the drive to halt shipments of slaves in the 
1840s. It was a key development in the struggle to end the 
Angolan slave trade because of the pivotal role that Luanda 
played not only as a slave port but also as logistical hub for 
shipments from other Angolan ports. More recently, David 
Eltis has pointed out that further understanding of the 
end of the slave trade necessitates a more comprehensive 
analysis of local factors, such as geography, internal African 
politics and the specifi c conditions of commerce on coastal 
Africa. In northern Angola, for example, an unfriendly busi-
ness environment and competition from African traders had 
a greater impact than British naval patrols on the demise 
of slave shipments (Ferreira, 1996). 
Th is chapter focuses on regional variations in 
Angola to analyze how external and local forces shaped 
the shipments of slaves between the 1830s and the 1860s. 
It combines evidence from the new Transatlantic Slave 
Trade Dataset (henceforth TSTD2) and a wide variety 
of archival data to reconstruct local conditions in which 
the trade was operated in diff erent Angolan regions. Th e 
chapter examines how diff erences in the dynamics of the 
coastal trade in the three Angolan slaving regions - north-
ern Angola, Luanda and Benguela - infl uenced the supply 
of slaves from the interior. Special attention is given to the 
understudied slave trade in Benguela in order to redress 
a Luanda-centered imbalance in the current literature on 
the Angolan trade. Th e chapter argues that a combination 
of internal and external factors shaped the last decades of 
the Angolan trade and ultimately led to its demise.
Background
Two cautionary notes are in order before delving 
into the analysis of the Angolan trade during the illegal 
period. First, the slave trade in Portuguese territories in 
Africa was formally outlawed only in 1836. However, the 
passing in Brazil of a law that banned imports of slaves, 
in 1831, threw the Angolan trade into a state of eff ective 
illegality. Th e impact on Angola of the Brazilian law was 
a function of the tight commercial ties between the two 
regions, since Angola was the primary supplier of slaves 
to Brazil. Scholars of Brazil have long downplayed the 
importance of the 1831 legislation by arguing that it 
was not fully enforced (Bethell, 1976). Yet a closer look 
reveals that it led to a dramatic, albeit brief, reduction in 
imports of slaves, which in turn aff ected slave demography 
in Brazil. In the interior of São Paulo, for example, the 
number of Africa-born slaves dropped from 55% in 1829 
to 21% in 1835 (Luna and Klein, 2004, p. 131). In Rio 
de Janeiro, “the slave market in Rio de Janeiro changed 
substantially with the ‘legal’ prohibition on slave imports” 
(Frank, 2004, p. 20-21).
Furthermore, the law reverberated across the At-
lantic and altered the ways that the trade was conducted in 
Angola (Ferreira, 1996). First, it added further momentum 
to a process of decentralization of shipments of slaves away 
from Luanda and towards northern Angola that had been 
underway since early nineteenth century when the British 
dropped out of slaving. Second, it marked the beginning 
of more intense, if initially utterly failed, anti-slave trade 
measures geared towards the slave trade across the south-
ern Atlantic (Ferreira, 1996). Although the reduction of 
shipments of slaves in Luanda and Benguela was brief, the 
law seems to have led to a spurt of suppressive measures 
that forced slave dealers to devise new organizational 
strategies to conduct the trade. Th ese were so eff ective 
as to allow the continuation of shipments of slaves for 
several decades and to in eff ect hold the rising tide of 
abolitionism at bay. In this paper, thus, the Brazilian law 
is considered as the actual threshold to the beginning of 
the illegality of the Angolan trade.
Secondly, most of the scholarship takes a Luanda-
centric approach to the Angolan trade, despite the exist-
ence of an entrenched three-pronged commercial structure 
(northern Angola, Luanda and Benguela) since the late 
seventeenth century (Miller, 1988). In the sixteenth cen-
tury, the trade was concentrated in northern Angola, but 
it expanded southward in the fi nal decades of the century 
due to diminishing Portuguese control and the rising im-
portance of creolized groups from São Tomé and Kongo 
(Th ornton, 1998, p. 61-62). Th e southward expansion grew 
out of Portuguese plans to strengthen state control and 
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led to the foundation of Luanda in 1576 (Miller, 1976). 
In Benguela, after an early attempt to develop slaving 
failed in the fi rst half of the seventeenth century, exports 
of slaves increased towards the end of the century and 
became a full-fl edged independent operation in the fi rst 
decades of the eighteenth century (Ferreira, 2003).
Northern Angola, Luanda and Benguela each 
had distinct patterns of internal and coastal commerce. 
In northern Angola, for example, the internal trading 
networks were dominated by Vili merchants from Loango 
and extended into Kongo territory and southward to 
central Angola. Unlike trading networks supplying slaves 
to coastal Luanda, they were not monopolized by states 
or bureaucratic structures, and displayed a high degree of 
decentralization that made them better suited to respond 
to the rise in demand for forced labor emanating from the 
Atlantic world in the late seventeenth century. Th ese net-
works contributed signifi cantly to key transformations in 
the enslavement of Africans, which made Angolan slaving 
move away from military techniques towards a variety of 
non-military methods to acquire slaves. As a result of the 
growth of decentralized Vili trading networks, the supply 
of slaves to northern Angola was more reliable than to 
Luanda. Th e advantages of this structure became clear 
in the late seventeenth century when ships that would 
otherwise conduct slaving in Luanda began tapping into 
northern Angola slaving to compensate for diffi  culties to 
embark slaves in Luanda (Ferreira, 2003).
In Luanda, David Eltis has suggested that the 
existence of a European coastal stronghold might have 
created a more reliable supply of slaves. In fact, Luanda’s 
commercial relationships with internal regions providing 
slaves was marked by strong dependency on the Kassanje 
and, secondarily, Matamba kingdoms. Th ese two kingdoms 
were located in the Luanda hinterland and played a pivotal 
role in the internal slave trade in that region. Th eir rulers 
prevented agents operating on behalf of Luanda merchants 
from tapping into slave markets east of the Kwango River 
and they eff ectively held a grip over the internal trade. 
Since the Luanda government was largely dependent on 
Kassanje for soldiers and protection, the relationship was 
tinged by political and military considerations, limiting 
attempts to diversify internal sources of slaves to Luanda. 
Kasanje’s leverage and semi-monopolistic control over the 
internal commerce seriously undermined Luanda’s capacity 
to respond to demands for labor throughout the Atlantic. 
Th is was particularly clear at the end of the seventeenth 
century when Luanda failed to adequately respond to the 
rising demand for slaves in the wake of the discovery of 
gold mines in Brazil (Ferreira, 2003).
In addition to the internal supply of slaves, the 
regulatory bureaucracy on the coast also aff ected ship-
ment of slaves. While northern Angola was by far the 
least regulated region, merchants operating out of Luanda 
and, to a lesser extent, Benguela dealt with corrupt-riddled 
administrations that at times posed serious impediments 
to their capacity to conduct business. Th e lack of regula-
tory bureaucracy in northern Angola in no way meant full 
freedom to conduct trade. In reality, African authorities 
exerted tight control over coastal trade and were highly 
conscious of the benefi ts of commercial independence. 
Th ey fi rmly rejected European attempts to encroach on 
their territories. Th is was particularly clear when African 
forces frustrated a British attempt to build a fort in Cab-
inda in 1721. Another example of African control over 
the coastal trade was revealed when Africans defeated an 
expedition sent by the Portuguese to cut off  African com-
mercial links with the French in Cabinda in the 1780s. 
Indeed, for most of the eighteenth century, northern 
Angola was outside Portuguese infl uence altogether.
In the seventeenth century, the three Angolan 
regions providing slaves for the Atlantic were relatively 
integrated. For example, approximately thirty percent of 
Africans exported from Luanda in the 1680s came from 
Benguela. In northern Angola, the Dutch held an upper 
hand in the coastal trade in the second half of the seven-
teenth century, but ships from Brazil and Luanda were 
still allowed to embark slaves. However, trade in the three 
regions gradually diversifi ed in the eighteenth century, 
signaling the growing commercialization of the Angolan 
trade. By the 1730s, for example, instead of complying 
with the mandatory stop over in Luanda to pay duties 
on slaves, most of the slavers bound from Benguela sailed 
directly to Brazil (Ferreira, 2003). In northern Angola, as 
the Dutch and the Portuguese lost ground to the Brit-
ish and the French in the eighteenth century, the trade 
became even more international and links with Luanda 
faded. In the early nineteenth century, the introduction of 
measures to abolish the slave trade changed this dynamic 
signifi cantly by triggering tighter integration between 
northern Angola and Luanda. As will be explored in the 
next section, Benguela, however, stood in sharp contrast to 
the other regions, as it held closer ties with Rio de Janeiro 
than with any other city in the Atlantic.
Benguela
Recent estimates indicate that Benguela was 
second only to Luanda in terms of shipments of slaves 
between the 1830s and 1860s. However, reconstructing 
patterns of trade in Benguela remains a problem, due to 
the shadowy nature of the slaving business in that region 
and lack of documentation. Since the early eighteenth 
century, Benguela served as a safe haven for outcasts 
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seeking to conduct slaving away from Luanda offi  cials. 
Largely independent from Luanda, the city gravitated 
towards Brazil, receiving capital and experiencing eco-
nomic infl uence by merchants from Rio de Janeiro. In the 
nineteenth century, several Benguelan merchants, many 
of whom had either been born or lived in Rio de Janeiro, 
still held tight ties with that Brazilian city. Unsurprisingly, 
the Benguelan economy was more closely linked to Brazil 
than to Portugal. As late as 1837, for example, Benguela 
imports of Brazilian rum - one of the main commodities 
used in the internal slave trade - stood at 1,000 pipas a 
year, half of the amount of Brazilian rum imported by the 
primary Angolan slave port at Luanda.2
Th e domination of slaver dealers over local politics 
was a key dimension of the continuation of shipments of 
slaves in Benguela, and several dealers actually held the 
position of governor of Benguela. In 1836, for example, 
Justiniano José dos Réis, a Brazil-born individual with 
deep links with the slave trade since the 1820s, was the 
governor of Benguela.3 In 1841, another merchant with 
clear connections with the slave trade assumed the posi-
tion of governor.4 Two years later, the position was taken 
up by Manoel Joaquim Teixeira, then one of the main 
actors in the slave trade.5 Teixeira held close contacts with 
Brazil and left for Rio in 1844. He continued to exert in-
fl uence in Benguela until his return to the city in the early 
1850s when he was accused by the British of seeking to 
revive the slave trade.6 As late as 1850, British authorities 
argued that years of eff orts to halt the trade were under-
mined by a governor sympathetic to slave dealers.7
Furthermore, local politics were driven by attempts 
to ban the trade and the animosity that mulattoes - a 
group comprised of mixed-race individuals, blacks and 
locally-born white individuals - held towards Portugal. 
In 1835, por example, racially-driven tensions surfaced 
during an aborted revolt against the Benguela admin-
istration.8 Mullatoes played a pivotal role in the local 
bureaucracy. In 1842, for example, while the offi  cial in 
charge of administering the customs house in Benguela 
was a black man, his immediate subordinate was a mixed-
race offi  cial.9 With their close connections with African 
chiefs in the interior, mullatoes framed the struggle against 
the slave trade as a European attempt to take away their 
power. Invariably, they used the infl uential positions they 
held in the local administration to undermine attempts 
to enforce anti-slave trade measures. In 1850, authorities 
stated that “mullatoes from this district (Benguela) have 
become off ensive and restive, being particularly bitter to-
wards Portuguese individuals who they pejoratively called 
galegos, in addition to stating publicly that Benguela will 
only calm down when galegos are expelled from positions 
they have come to hold in the administration”.10
In anticipation of the expected end of the importa-
tion of slaves in Brazil in 1830, the Lisbon government 
ordered the Benguela governor to seek to reorient the 
local economy to a post-slave trade scenario in 1827.11 
One year later, in an early sign of anti-slave trade senti-
ment in Brazil, the Luanda administration reported that 
ships bound from Luanda were facing diffi  culties enter-
ing Brazil because of British pressure on the Brazilian 
authorities.12 Despite the pressures, shipments of slaves in 
Benguela were still signifi cant in 1830.13 In that year ten 
ships recorded in the TSTD2 picked up 3,926 Africans 
from Benguela and took them across the Atlantic to Rio 
de Janeiro. Th e end of the legal slave trade in Brazil dealt 
a signifi cant blow to the Benguela trade. As demonstrated 
by TSTD2, while an average twelve annual voyages origi-
nated in the city during the legal trade in the 1820s, only 
one voyage was registered between 1831 and 1835.
Between 1836 and 1839, the number of voyages 
entered a decidedly upward spiral and the Benguela trade 
seems to have surpassed 1820s levels. Although TSTD2 
identifi es only three ships leaving Benguela in 1836, the 
number of ships that actually sailed in that year might 
have been higher. Th is is suggested by the number of ap-
plications for state licenses to leave Benguela submitted 
by ship captains. Fourteen ships received licenses that year, 
and although none of the ships declared that they were 
carrying slaves, the fact that all presented fabricated routes 
– usually including Mozambique and Uruguay - strongly 
2 “Carta de Manoel da Cruz” on October, 20, 1837, Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa (thereafter BNL), cód. 600.
3 “Ordem do Governador de Benguela” on June 12, 1836 (AHNA, cód. 521, ﬂ s. 34-34v).
4 “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on July 20, 1841 (AHNA, cód. 15, ﬂ s. 60-60v).
5 “Ofício do Governador de Benguela” on March 26, 1844 (AHNA, cód. 455, ﬂ . 51).
6 In 1846, three years after leaving Benguela on the grounds of seeking medical care in Brazil, Teixeira was still in Rio. See “Ofício do Secretário de Governo de Benguela” on July 
24, 1846 (AHNA, cód. 461). For Teixeira’s return to Benguela, see “Ofício do Governador de Benguela” on December 5, 1853 (AHNA, cód. 459, ﬂ s. 22v.-25v).
7 “Portaria do Ministério da Marinha e Ultramar” on September 27, 1850 (AHNA, cód. 263, ﬂ . 177). See Draft of Dispatch to the British Consul in Lisbon on October 30, 1850 
(PRO, FO 84, 799, ﬂ s. 33-33v). The British successfully pushed for the dismissal of the oﬃ  cial. See Draft of Dispatch to the British Consul in Lisbon on December 14, 1850 (PRO, 
FO 84, 799, ﬂ s. 77-77v).
8 “Carta para o Juiz do Crime Interino e Relator da Alçada” on August 11, 1835 (AHNA, cód. 163, ﬂ s. 10-10v).
9 “Portaria da Secretaria de Governo da Marinha e Ultramar” on September 6, 1843 (AHNA, cód. 261, ﬂ s. 38v.-39).
10 “Ofício do Governador de Benguela” on September 9, 1850 (AHNA, cód. 459, ﬂ s. 16v.-17).
11 “Ofício de Antonio Manoel de Noronha” on April 7, 1827 (AHNA, cód. 7183, ﬂ . 58v).
12 “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on March 31, 1828 (AHU, Angola, cx. 158, doc. 58).
13 “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on December 14, 1830 (AHNA, cód. 12, ﬂ s. 51v.-55).
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suggests implication in the trade in slaves (AHNA, cód. 
521). In the following years, both the TSTD2 and the 
license applications suggest that shipments of slaves grew 
further. In 1837, for example, TSTD2 indicates that eight 
ships left Benguela, but since the number of licenses stood 
at 25, the number might have been even higher (AHNA, 
cód. 521). Documentation from Portuguese archives 
shows that nine ships from Benguela were apprehended in 
Rio de Janeiro in the fi rst half of 1837 alone, which seems 
to further evidence that the overall number of slavers 
picking up slaves in Benguela was higher than registered 
in TSTD2.14 In 1838, according to the German traveler 
George Tams, approximately 20,000 slaves were embark-
ed from Benguela (Tams, 1850, p. 110).
Unprecedented British and Portuguese actions 
against the slave trade provide further, yet indirect, evi-
dence of the surge in shipments of slaves in the following 
years. In 1839, for example, in order to avoid embarkations 
of slaves in the vicinity of Benguela, the Luanda govern-
ment decreed that no ships could leave the city after fi ve 
in the afternoon.15 As indicated by TSTD2, these measures 
were largely unsuccessful, with fourteen ships leaving in 
that year alone. As British forces zeroed in on Benguela, 
however, anti-slave trade repression was bolstered and 
seems to have yielded more favorable results.16 Backed 
by a controversial and short-lived convention signed by 
the Governor of Angola, Antonio Manoel de Noronha 
- an anti-slave trade offi  cial who held a short tenure in 
Luanda - , the British received far more legal and practi-
cal freedom to interfere with Portuguese property and 
citizens than the Portuguese government was prepared 
to concede at the time.17 Th e British actions were short-
lived but suffi  cient to reduce the number of ships sailing 
to only seven in 1840.18
Th ereafter, British attempts to suppress the trade 
lost a lot of momentum as Luanda merchants - most of 
them deeply engaged in the slave trade - led a campaign to 
overturn the anti-slave trade legislation. Th is development 
seems to have spurred an immediate growth in shipments 
of slaves in 1841 and 1842.19 As shown by TSTD2, fi fteen 
ships left Benguela both years, with fi ve of them clear-
ing out in a single month of 1841.20 British demands for 
the cessation of shipments of slaves continued but were 
ignored by Luanda offi  cials who argued that shipments 
per se were not the most crucial element of the trade and 
that these took place outside the city. Two reports writ-
ten in 1841 hint at the magnitude of shipments of slaves 
from Benguela. Th e fi rst mentions 8,000 slaves and the 
second refers to 5,000 Africans held for embarkation in 
Benguela.21 Although these numbers do not provide direct 
evidence of shipment, they strongly suggest that Benguela 
was, at the very least, a signifi cant entrepot for slaving 
operations conducted in the region. 
To cope with continued eff orts to restrict the 
traffi  c, slave dealers relied on several strategies, including 
the extensive use of bribes to the few local offi  cials that 
might have opposed the slave trade. Th is is refl ected in a 
sequence of investigations at the time. In 1840, for exam-
ple, British demands forced the Luanda government to 
launch an investigation into widespread corruption.22 One 
year later, a governor of Benguela fl ed to Pernambuco in 
northeastern Brazil after being charged with participating 
in the slave trade.23 In 1843, Lisbon ordered a full-scale 
investigation of Benguela offi  cials following British deten-
tion of a Brazilian slave ship.24 As late as 1849, a governor 
of Benguela was accused of receiving bribes in exchange 
for turning a blind-eye to slave shipments.25
In contrast to Luanda, where by the early 1840s 
Portuguese legislation had had a serious impact on the 
trade, the primary threat to the Benguelan slave dealers 
came from British cruisers. To circumvent them, slave 
traders declared their vessels to be sailing to ports other 
than Brazil. Th us, twenty-nine out of the forty-six ships 
that received licenses to clear out between 1835 and 
1837 declared the Portuguese colony of Mozambique, 
not Brazil, as the fi nal destination (AHNA, cód. 521). 
By so doing, they took advantage of the clause of the 
Portuguese anti-slave trade decree from 1836 that al-
lowed the transport of slaves between diff erent Portuguese 
colonies. In case ships were apprehended by the British, 
14 “Ofício de Sá da Bandeira” in 1837 (AHU, papéis de Sá da Bandeira, maço 824).
15 “Bando do Governador de Benguela” on May 11, 1839 (AHNA, cód. 522, ﬂ  7v).
16 At least one ship was apprehended in 1840. See “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on April 22, 1840 (AHNA, cód. 15, ﬂ . 1).
17 “Carta do comandante do Navio Urania” on October 10, 1839 (PRO, FO 84, 322, ﬂ s. 135-136v).
18 Documentation that indicates that 30 ships left Benguela with slaves in 1841 seems to be a clear exaggeration. See “Apontamento sobre Angola” on May 27, 1841 (AHU, 
papéis de Sá da Bandeira, maço 827).
19 The British did apprehend two ships loaded with slaves, in 1841 and 1842, but that did little to reign in slave dealers. See “Portaria do Governador de Benguela” on July 1, 
1841 (AHNA, cód. 522, ﬂ . 114); “Edital do Governador Interino de Benguela” on May 25, 1843 (AHNA, cód. 522, ﬂ s. 172 v.-174).
20 “Portaria da Secretaria de Estado da Marinha do Ultramar” on May 26, 1841 (AHNA, cód. 260, ﬂ s. 53v.-54v).
21 “Apontamento sobre Angola” on May 27, 1841 (AHU, papéis de Sá da Bandeira, maço 827); “Apontamento de Pedro Alexandrino da Cunha” on August 6, 1841 (AHU, papéis 
de Sá da Bandeira, maço 827).
22 “Portaria do Governador de Benguela” on July 7, 1840 (AHNA, cód. 522, ﬂ s. 63-63v).
23 “Decreto Real” on March 2, 1841 (AHNA, cód. 260, ﬂ s. 17v.-18); “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on June 12, 1841, (AHNA, cód. 15, ﬂ s. 55-55v).
24 “Portaria da Secretaria de Governo da Marinha e Ultramar” on May 20, 1843 (AHNA, cód. 261, ﬂ s. 12-12v).
25 “Relatório do Juiz de Direito da Comarca de Luanda” on December 18, 1849 (AHU, segunda seção de Angola, pasta 16).
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the loophole allowed them to provide justifi cation for 
carrying enslaved Africans. Th is strategy was part of a 
deception that began in Brazil, where ships would obtain 
documents declaring Montevideo as the fi nal destination 
and places like Benguela and Ambriz as stopovers on the 
way to Uruguay (AHI, Coleções Especiais, lata 25, maço 
4, pasta 1, Paquete do Sul, 1833-34). In fact, the majority 
of the ships calling into Benguela in the 1830s were vessels 
that sailed to Angola to pick up slaves before returning 
to Brazil. Between May and July 1837, for example, nine 
Portuguese slave vessels seized in Rio de Janeiro were said 
to have sailed out of Benguela.26
Another strategy that slave traders used to con-
tinue the transatlantic traffi  c in slaves was to move embar-
kations of slaves away from Benguela to nearby regions. 
Although not on the same scale as the decentralization of 
the Luanda trade following the end of imports of slaves in 
Brazil in 1831, this helped slave dealers to circumvent the 
growth of anti-slave trade measures by British cruisers in 
the mid-1840s. Slaves were sometimes loaded in regions 
such as Kikombo and Novo Redondo (a presídio created 
by the Luanda administration in the late eighteenth cen-
tury to prevent smuggling), but slave dealers seem to have 
favored closer places south of Benguela, such as Egito and 
Baia Farta.27 In 1850, a British commander declared, “I 
have ascertained the existence of barracoons or shacks at 
Bahia Farta (six miles to the southward and westward of 
Benguela) and at point of Salinas, and I believe these bar-
racoons may contain between 800 and 100 slaves each”.28 
As late as the mid-1850s, slave dealers would circumvent 
eff orts to suppress the trade by setting up farms where Af-
ricans were put to work in “licit” activities such as picking 
orchella gum. Once ships ventured into the region, these 
slaves were sold into Atlantic slaving.29
Despite these strategies, TSTD2 demonstrates 
that slave shipments from Benguela declined to an average 
of just six a year between 1843 and 1849. Th is development 
grew out of a Portuguese push to strengthen metropolitan 
sway over Benguela which damaged local slaving networks 
and by particularly intense military operations carried out 
by British and Portuguese cruisers. Th e latter included, 
for example, a British cruiser inspecting ships sitting in 
the Benguela port to ensure that they were not holding 
slaves.30 More importantly, it led to the destruction by 
British and Portuguese cruisers of several entrepots (bar-
racons) used by dealers to hold slaves along the Benguela 
coast.31 Th ese measures were combined with a crackdown 
that led to the imprisonment of individuals involved in 
shipping slaves.32
Second, and undoubtedly more important, the 
local slaving network was undermined by a colonial push 
by Portugal to establish more rigid control over Benguela. 
Mullatoes and local merchants were those most aff ected by 
the measures. José Ferreira Gomes is a case in point of the 
damage suff ered by slave trade networks managed by local 
elites. Gomes was the son of Francisco Ferreira Gomes, 
who was born in Rio de Janeiro and became a wealthy 
slave dealer in Benguela in the 1820s. In 1834, Francisco 
Ferreira Gomes returned to Rio de Janeiro, where he con-
tinued to be involved in the slave trade and assigned his 
son, José Ferreira Gomes, with the task of overseeing his 
business in Benguela. Married to the daughter of a local 
traditional leader (soba) from nearby Catumbela, the son 
had tight links with Africa and was reputed to be one of 
the two primary merchants in Benguela in 1835. In the 
late 1840s, the arrest of José Ferreira Gomes and his as-
sociates from Benguela and Catumbela dealt a signifi cant 
blow to the Benguela trade.33
Luanda
Th e case of the Luanda trade illustrates how a 
combination of external and local forces shaped the slave 
trade in Angola. Th e local forces are perhaps best repre-
sented by the changes in the supply of slaves to Luanda. 
Traditionally, Luanda relied on the Mbundu kingdoms 
of Kasanje and Kassanje for slaves, but that changed 
signifi cantly as internal trading networks were further 
fragmented in the nineteenth century. More than ever, 
pumbeiros (internal merchants) and sertanejos (also internal 
merchants but with more resources) became key suppliers 
of slaves to Luanda and Benguela. In 1846, for example, 
26 “Ofício de Sá da Bandeira” in 1837, Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, thereafter AHU, papéis de Sá da Bandeira, maço 824.
27 “Ofício para o Comandante do Brigue Audaz” on August 4, 1842 (AHNA, cod. 452, ﬂ . 165v.); “Ofício do Governador de Benguela” on October 26, 1846 (AHNA, cod. 7183, 
ﬂ s. 109v.-110v.); “Ordens e Instruções” on December 24, 1846 (AHNA, cod. 1178, ﬂ s. 1-1v.); “Ofício do Governador de Benguela” on November 27, 1848 (AHNA, cód. 459, ﬂ s. 
2v.-3v.).
28 “Carta de Hastings” on March 4, 1850 (AHU, segunda seção de Angola, pasta 16ª).
29 “Circular aos Negociantes de Benguela” on March 19, 1850 (AHNA, cód. 461, ﬂ s. 22v.-23v.); “Ofício do Secretário do Governo de Angola” on April 24, 1850 (AHNA, cód. 511, 
ﬂ s. 218-218v.); Dispatch by Gabriel and Jackson on February 20, 1854 (PRO, FO 84, 932, ﬂ s. 42-43v.). “Ofício do Governador de Benguela” on March 11, 1854 (AHNA, cód. 467, 
ﬂ s. 153-155); “Ofício da Estação Naval” on April 17, 1854 (Arquivo Geral da Marinha (thereafter AGM), cx. 319).
30 “Edital do Governador Interino de Benguela” on May 25, 1843 (AHNA, cód. 522, ﬂ s. 172 v.-174); “Ofício do Secretário de Governo de Benguela” on October 18, 1843 (AHNA, 
cód. 454, ﬂ s. 76-76v.).
31 “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on February 17, 1846 (AHU, segunda seção de Angola, pasta 10 A); “Ofício do Governador de Benguela” on October 26, 1846 (AHNA, cód. 
7183, ﬂ s. 109v.-110v.); “Edital do Governo de Benguela” on October 31, 1846 (AHNA, cód. 523, ﬂ s. 16-16v.).
32 “Registros da Cadeia Pública de Benguela” on March 12, 1846 (AHNA, caixa 145).
33 “Ofício do Governador de Benguela” on November 27, 1846 (AHNA, cód. 455, ﬂ s. 251v.); “Ofício do Governador de Benguela” on December 25, 1848 (AHNA, cx. 5426).
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three subjects of the Matamba kingdom - acting in their 
capacity of pumbeiros - arrived at Luanda with a number 
of slaves to sell.34 Meanwhile, the Luanda administration 
escalated pressures on the Kasanje ruler to comply with 
demands by Luanda merchants for better access to slave 
markets.35 While Kasanje and Matamba relied on the east 
Lunda Empire for slaves, pumbeiros and sertanejos tapped 
into sources of slaves in regions that were closer to the 
coast and under more direct infl uence of the Luanda 
government. Th e decentralization of the internal trade 
made access to slaves easier than in the past, thus making 
it particularly diffi  cult to bring the coastal trade to an end.
Local forces were also refl ected by the slave dealers’ 
hegemonic position in Luanda politics. As in Benguela, 
the Luanda elite was comprised of an amalgam of Bra-
zilian and locally-born merchants who had little, if any, 
commitment to Portuguese plans to turn the Angolan 
economy away from the slave trade. In 1840, for example, 
one of the key aides to the governor of Angola was José 
Botelho Sampaio, a Luanda-born offi  cial.36 By holding 
key government positions and exerting pressure on the 
Luanda administration, slave dealers successfully under-
mined eff orts to enforce anti-slave trade legislation. Th e 
backlash caused by an agreement signed by Governor 
Noronha with British forces is particularly illuminating. 
Th e agreement resulted in the apprehension of several 
slave vessels and eventually led to the resignation of Gov-
ernor Noronha.37 Unsurprisingly, an Angolan governor 
argued that if he “enforced anti slave-trade legislation, 
his closest aides would resign and he would be left with 
an unleashed unrest to deal with”.38 Furthermore, though 
not as intensely as in Benguela, Luanda politics was also 
driven by racial tension.39
Brazilian nationals intimately involved in the slave 
trade played a signifi cant role in Luanda politics. Francisco 
Teixeira Miranda is a case in point. One of the wealthiest 
slave dealers in Luanda in the 1840s, Miranda provided 
part of the soldiers and horses used by the Luanda ad-
ministration to vanquish the Tala Mugongo outpost, 
thus eff ectively helping to expand the borders of regions 
under legal Portuguese infl uence.40 Another example is 
provided by the case of Francisco Antonio Flores, who 
went to Luanda in the 1840s as a local representative of 
a Rio de Janeiro commercial house and became the para-
mount Brazilian investor in Angola until the early 1860s. 
Despite being deported from Angola in the 1850s, Flores 
had tight links with Governors and even British offi  cials 
serving on the Court of Mixed Commission established 
in Luanda. In the late 1840s, even while shipments of 
slaves were subsiding, the number of Brazilians - most of 
them involved in slaving in northern Angola - applying 
for licenses to live in Angola far surpassed the number 
of applications by individuals of any other nationality. In 
the fi rst semester of 1848, for example, approximately 25 
Brazilian nationals requested licenses to live in Luanda 
(AHNA, códs. 167, 168, and 171).
Close links with Brazil and the advent of interna-
tional eff orts to suppress the slave trade are examples of 
external forces that shaped the shipment of slaves from 
Angola. Even after serious Portuguese eff orts to undercut 
Angolan ties with Brazil, most of the imports in Luanda 
still originated in Rio de Janeiro.41 In fact, according to a 
Portuguese consul in Rio, the volume of exports from Rio 
de Janeiro to Luanda and Benguela in 1843 was as large 
as Rio’s exports to Portugal.42 Unsurprisingly, the trade 
was seriously disrupted when British demands forced 
Brazil to ban imports of slaves in 1831. Th e decline is 
clearly refl ected in TSTD2, which indicates that only fi ve 
ships left Luanda in 1832, a sharp drop from the number 
of ships leaving in the previous years. As a result, prices 
of slaves decreased dramatically, severely aff ecting Lu-
anda’s economy.43 According to the Luanda government 
chamber, fi nancial losses caused by the end of shipments 
of slaves were “incalculable”.44 Slave dealers responded 
to prohibition by relocating to northern Angola, where 
they had been investing since the British withdrawal from 
Atlantic slaving in 1807 (Getz, 2004, p. 38; Law, 2004, 
p. 157-158; Strickrodt, 2002, p. 238).
34 “Ofício do Secretário do Governo de Angola” on August 5, 1846 (AHNA, cód. 105, ﬂ s. 87-87v.).
35 “Portaria do Governador de Angola” on March 2, 1838 (AHNA, cód. 101, ﬂ . 19v.).
36 “Mapa Demonstrativo dos Oﬁ ciais do Estado Maior da Província em junho de 1840” (AHU, segunda seção de Angola, pasta 3 C).
37 “Representação da Câmara Municipal de Luanda” on October 9, 1839 (AHU, segunda seção de Angola, pasta 5); “Representação da Câmara de Luanda” on December 2, 1839 
(AHU, segunda seção de Angola, pasta 5); “Protesto de José da Lomba, Capitão do Patacho Português Treze de Junho” on June 30, 1840 (PRO, FO 84, 322); “Representação do 
Tenente Ananias Xavier” on August 7, 1840 (AHU, segunda seção de Angola, pasta 4 B); “Portaria do Governador de Benguela” on July 1, 1841 (AHNA, cód. 522, ﬂ . 114); “Ofício 
do Conselho de Governo de Angola” on September 4, 1842 (AHNA, cód. 15, ﬂ s. 157v.-158); “Ofício do Secretário de Governo” on May 20, 1843 (AHNA, cód. 102. Fl. 98); “Edital 
do Governador Interino de Benguela” on May 25, 1843 (AHNA, cód. 522, ﬂ s. 172 v.-174); “Ofício do Secretário de Governo” on October 18, 1843 (AHNA, cód. 454, ﬂ s. 76-76v.). 
See also  Stamm (1971, p. 159).
38 “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on May 17, 1843 (AHU, segunda seção de Angola, pasta 6 A).
39 “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on December 6, 1837 (AHU, segunda seção de Angola, pasta 2); “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on June 5, 1840 (AHU, segunda seção 
de Angola, pasta 3 C).
40 “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on January 19, 1841 (AHNA, cód. 15, ﬂ s. 36-36v.). Miranda had been living in Luanda for seven years and dealing in slaves on behalf of a 
commercial house in Rio de Janeiro. See “Ofício conﬁ dencial do Juiz de Direito de Luanda” on January 20, 1842 (AHU, segunda seção de Angola, pastas 5 A e 5 B).
41 “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on April 8, 1836 (AHNA, cód. 13, ﬂ s. 1-3).
42 “Ofício do Vice-Cônsul Português no Rio de Janeiro” on April 24, 1843 (AHNA, caixa 1479).
43 “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on April 8, 1836 (AHNA, cód. 13, ﬂ s. 10v.-12v.).
44 “Representação da Câmara de Luanda” on October 5, 1833 (AHU, cx. 177. Doc. 15).
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Th e resumption of the Luanda trade paralleled the 
revival of imports of slaves in Brazil in the mid-1830s. 
In 1835, for example, TSTD2 indicates that 15 ships left 
Luanda. However, shipments of slaves might have been 
greater, as according to Portuguese authorities 45 ships 
might have left that year.45 In that same year, a British 
commander reported “thirty-two Portuguese vessels of 
all types and one Spaniard, trading for slaves”.46 In 1836, 
although TSTD2 indicates that the number of slave ships 
sailing reached 27, an Italian traveler and a newly-arrived 
Governor estimated thirty five.47 In 1838 and 1839, 
Portuguese assessments put the annual number of ships 
leaving Luanda at around forty ships.48 However, TSTD2 
indicates that the actual number stood at 49.
As in Benguela, slave dealers had to develop new 
methods to conduct the trade in Luanda. An Italian traveler 
reported that governors charged a fee for each ship leav-
ing Luanda.49 In addition, records of ship sales in Luanda 
demonstrate that Brazilian merchants would fi ctitiously sell 
their ships to Portuguese nationals to avoid British cruisers 
by sailing under the Portuguese fl ag. In 1832, for example, 
Remígio Luiz dos Santos, a Brazilian merchant based in 
Angola, sold a ship to Luiz Gomes Ribeiro, a Luanda-born 
Portuguese and one of the most prominent slave dealers in 
Luanda.50 Despite the strategy, authorities estimated that 
most of the ships sailing under the Portuguese fl ag were in 
fact owned by Brazilian merchants or by Portuguese nation-
als based in Brazil.51 Th e practice of using the Portuguese 
fl ag became so common that a British commander reported 
that “although under Portuguese colors, I have every reason 
to suppose they were Brazilian property, as more than two 
thirds of them belonged to ports in the Brazils (sic) and 
were bound for there”.52
In the early 1840s, as reported by the German 
traveler George Tams, shipments of slaves in Luanda were 
conducted at night due to the need to avoid heightened 
repression (Tams, 1850, p. 212). In 1841, the number of 
ships leaving Luanda dropped forty percent, with only 
eighteen vessels clearing out of the city. As demonstrated 
by TSTD2, shipments rose again during the following two 
years, but they never returned to the levels reached in the 
late 1830s. In fact, the downward trend was consolidated 
from 1845 to 1850, when the average number of ships 
leaving Luanda annually was less than one tenth the 
number of the late 1830s when the illegal trade peaked. 
As in Benguela, the downfall of the Luanda trade 
was a function of a variety of anti-slave trade measures 
by Portuguese authorities and intensifying naval opera-
tions by British and Portuguese cruisers. Th e anti-slave 
trade measures were refl ected in criminal cases prosecuted 
between 1845 and 1848, approximately 20 percent of 
which were related to the slave trade.53 Th e crackdown on 
slave dealers in Luanda bore a clear resemblance to what 
was then taking place in Benguela. Furthermore, special 
measures were taken to deal with the large number of 
Brazilian nationals who lived in Luanda while carrying out 
activities related to the slave trade. For example, Brazilians 
living in Angola were prohibited from freely circulating 
and were required to register with the administration.54
Anti-slave trade measures were also refl ected in 
more intense naval patrolling along the Angolan coast. Th e 
Portuguese squadron established headquarters in Luanda, 
and French and American warships joined British and 
Portuguese cruisers to control slaving activities. French 
and American actions vis-à-vis Brazil and Portugal were 
seriously limited by the absence of anti-slave treaties with 
these countries, which meant that they could only suppress 
French and American activities. In 1846, British authorities 
stated, “Th e number of vessels engaged or supposed to be 
engaged in the slave traffi  c which have been captured or 
destroyed by these respective squadrons (British, French, 
Portuguese and American squadrons) so far as our informa-
tion demonstrates amounts to 61 and is as follows: captured 
by the British: 37; by the French: 11; by the Portuguese: 
5; by the Americans: 2; destroyed by the British: 3; by the 
French: 1; by the Portuguese: 2”.55 In 1847, the British 
requested permission for their troops to land in territories 
under Portuguese control so that they could destroy bar-
racoons where slaves were held for the slave trade.56 Between 
1847 and 1852, a military ship entered or left the Luanda 
45 “Carta de Luanda” on May 24, 1835 (AHU, pápeis de Sá da Bandeira, maço 2922).
46 “Relatório do Comandante do Brigue Charybolis” on September 6, 1835 (AGM, cx. 311).
47 “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on April 8, 1836 (AHNA, cód. 13, ﬂ s. 5-10v.).
48 “Apontamento do Tenente Lima” in 1838 (AHU, papéis de Sá da Bandeira, maço 827).
49 “Ofício de Feliciano António Pereira” on June 18, 1838 (AHU, papéis de Sá da Bandeira, maço 824).
50 “Biblioteca Municipal de Luanda”, thereafter BML, (cód. 37, ﬂ . 124v.).
51 “Ofício do Cônsul Português no Rio de Janeiro” on June 16, 1834 (AHNA, Luanda, avulsos, cx. 1465).
52 “Relatório do Comandante do Brigue Charybolis” on September 6, 1835 (AGM, cx. 311).
53 “Boletim oﬁ cial do Governo Geral da Província de Angola” on October 3, 1846; “Boletim oﬁ cial do Governo Geral da Província de Angola” on July 31, 1847; “Boletim oﬁ cial do 
Governo Geral da Província de Angola” on January 1, 1848; “Boletim oﬁ cial do Governo Geral da Província de Angola” on October 1, 1848. See also Ferreira, “Dos Sertões ao 
Atlântico”.
54 “Ofício do Secretário de Governo de Angola” on November 14, 1845 (AHNA, cód. 104, ﬂ . 65); “Ofício do Secretário de Governo” on January 17, 1846 (AHNA, cód. 104, ﬂ s. 
132-132v.).
55 Report on the Slave Trade by Edmond Gabriel and George Jackson on February 18, 1847 (PRO, FO 84, 671, 1847, ﬂ s. 99-11).
56 Dispatch by the British Consul in Lisbon on May 17, 1847 (PRO, FO 84, 676, ﬂ s. 30-33); “Ofício do Ministério da Marinha e Ultramar” on May 22, 1847 (AGM, cx. 311).
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port every three days and the number of cruisers far sur-
passed the number of ships seeking to conduct legal trade 
with Luanda (Ferreira, 1996).
Northern Angola
In this period, the region called northern Angola 
stretching from Ambriz to Cabinda was the focal point 
of the illegal slave trade in Angola. In addition to coastal 
geographic features that greatly benefi ted shipments of 
slaves, the dynamics of the trade in that region was dis-
tinctly diff erent from that in Benguela and, principally, 
Luanda. By any standards, northern Angola was the 
most international of the three Angolan regions ship-
ping slaves to the Atlantic. In Cabinda, the Portuguese 
and the Dutch took the lead in developing the trade, 
and the French and the British were quick to join. To 
highlight British lack of interest in the northern Angola 
trade, David Eltis has pointed out that the Royal British 
Company rejected plans to establish a permanent outpost 
in Kongo in the 1680s (Eltis, 2001). Between 1681 and 
1720, however, as demonstrated by TSTD2, ten British 
ships were conducting business in Cabinda, as compared 
with only eight French ships. 
Since the mid-seventeenth century, growing 
Dutch trade in northern Angola took a toll on Portuguese 
infl uence in northern Angola. Despite their dominance, 
the Dutch would still allow ships from Luanda to pick 
up slaves in Cabinda. Th e advance of British and French 
business, taking a far less compromising stand towards 
ships sailing under Portuguese fl ag, dealt a serious blow 
to the already declining Portuguese infl uence. In addition 
to pushing prices upward, the French and British used 
violence to drive Portuguese ships away (Ferreira, 2003). 
Writing in the early nineteenth century, Angolan Gover-
nor António Miguel Mello dated the beginning of British 
and French trade to the 1760s, but by then they had been 
participating in the trade for some time.57 Although the 
British trade suff ered a sharp decline after a military 
setback in 1721 when they sought to build a fortress in 
Cabinda, it soon resumed its expansion. From the 1720s 
to 1750s, as indicated by TSTD2, while forty-six British 
ships traded in Cabinda, forty-two French ships slaved in 
the region. In the second half of the eighteenth century, 
French domination in Cabinda was almost incontestable, 
as TSTD2 demonstrates that number of French ships 
(88) embarking slaves there was four times higher than 
the number of British ships (20) doing so.
In the second half of the eighteenth century, only 
three Portuguese ships participated in slaving activities 
in northern Angola - a testimony to the several failed 
Portuguese attempts to break the British and French grip 
in Cabinda. In the 1760s, for example, Luanda authorities 
sought to provide incentives for the city’s merchants to 
engage in trade in that region.58 In Rio, authorities also 
sought to convince merchants that trade in the region 
was worthwhile.59 In Luanda, however, the return of six 
ships that had not been able to purchase slaves in Cabinda 
made it clear that competition by foreigners was not easy 
to overcome.60 In fact, Portuguese trade between Cabinda 
and Luanda was strengthened only after diplomatic over-
tures by the Luanda government to African rulers in the 
nineteenth century (Carreira, 1969, p. 274). In 1803, for 
example, approximately one thousand Muxicongo slaves 
from Ambriz were sold in Luanda in a single month.61 
Th e volume of the trade with northern Angola might even 
have increased when Mdembo Muene Damba Mangombe 
sent a large, yet not specifi ed, number of slaves to Luanda 
merchants in 1804. Authorities then sent him gifts and 
reassured him that they would seek to guarantee favorable 
prices for slaves if he continued shipping slaves to Luanda.62
The British withdrawal from slaving in 1807 
profoundly altered the dynamic of the northern Ango-
lan trade by creating a vacuum that was quickly fi lled by 
Luanda and Brazilian merchants. Th e TSTD2 shows that 
ships sailing under the Portuguese fl ag - most of them 
actually outfi tted in Brazil - moved into Cabinda right 
after the British withdrawal. Although some funding for 
the trade came from Luanda, the center of gravity of the 
trade between Angola and Brazil shifted to Brazil. Bra-
zilian participation soon led to unprecedented levels of 
trade. By 1814, ships would still stop in Luanda on their 
way to Cabinda, but they soon stopped doing so and the 
Brazilian-dominated northern Angola trade developed 
into an independent operation.63 Between 1808 and 1822, 
for example, all but one of the approximately 255 ships 
leaving the area sailed under the Portuguese fl ag.
Although northern Angola muxicongo Africans 
would still be sent to Luanda via land, they were by all 
standards a minority and most of the Africans enslaved 
57 “Carta do Governador de Angola” on January 3, 1801 (AHU, Angola, cx. 98, doc. 6).
58 “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on November 25, 1768 (AHNA, cód. 3, ﬂ . 261-261v.).
59 “Ofício de Luiz de Vasconcellos e Silva” on June 30, 1783 (AHU, Rio de Janeiro, cx. 131, doc. 85).
60 “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on December 31, 1794 (AHNA, cód. 246, ﬂ s. 53-55).
61 The problem was that this occasional trade was via land and failed to evolve into long-term commercial relations. See “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on July 30, 1803 
(AHNA, cód. 9, ﬂ s. 37v.-38).
62 See “Carta do Governador de Angola” on August 14, 1804 (AHNA, cód. 240, ﬂ s. 29-29v.).
63 “Portaria do Governo de Angola” on September 6, 1814 (AHNA, cód. 277, ﬂ s. 148-148v.).
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in northern Angola were shipped from loading points in 
the region itself.64 Th e existence of more effi  cient routes 
for transporting slaves - in comparison to the routes lead-
ing to Luanda - lay at the heart of the growth of slaving 
in Cabinda. While the trade in Luanda was hindered by 
excessive reliance on the kingdom of Kassanje, Cabinda 
trading networks were highly decentralized and reached 
far into Central Africa. Second, as opposed to ships op-
erating out of Luanda, ships bound from Cabinda had 
a good chance of avoiding taxes for slaves shipped to 
Brazil.65 At any rate, after independence from Portugal in 
1822, Brazilian domination further increased, with 185 
Brazilian ships embarking slaves in Cabinda from 1823 
to 1831. Th e fi rst ship under a Brazilian fl ag recorded by 
TSTD2 showed up in Cabinda in 1826, and it is certain 
that the trade in that region was controlled by merchants 
from Rio de Janeiro.
Around the River Loje, just north of Luanda, the 
dynamic was not signifi cantly diff erent. Th e British fi rst 
developed the trade and the region became known by the 
name they used to refer to it - Ambriz. According to the 
TSTD2, however, although a British ship was the fi rst to 
embark slaves in Ambriz in 1786, they lagged well behind 
the French until the early 1790s - when war and the St 
Domingue Revolution dealt a huge blow to the French 
slave trade. From 1786 to 1792, for example, there were 
eleven French ships while the number of British ships was 
only seven. Soon thereafter, British ships dominated the 
trade until the British withdrew from slaving in 1807. Be-
tween 1793 and 1807, 27 British ships picked up slaves in 
Ambriz, but the number might actually have been higher. 
In 1793, for example, TSTD2 indicates only two slave 
voyages by British ships, yet authorities in Luanda indi-
cated that eleven British ships were slaving in Ambriz.66 
In contrast to Cabinda, where TSTD2 shows that 
shipments of slaves continued seamlessly in the aftermath 
of the 1807 British withdrawal from slaving, the trade 
in Ambriz seems to have been signifi cantly disrupted by 
the end of the British trade. In fact, slave embarkations in 
Cabinda only resumed in 1815, with nine ships recorded 
from 1815 to 1822, the year of Brazilian independence. 
Between 1823 and 1832, however, the number rose dra-
matically as 91 ships embarked slaves in Ambriz. Brazilian 
investors were responsible for the rise of shipments in 
Ambriz, as acknowledged by the Luanda administration 
in 1826.67 In contrast to the situation in Cabinda, however, 
several nations were involved in Ambriz. Th e TSTD2 
shows that the Spanish were already operating in Ambriz 
in 1809, and they seem to have intensifi ed their trade in 
that region by the early 1830s. A British commander 
calculated that 4,000 slaves were boarded on Spanish 
ships annually.68 However, the fact that the French, the 
Americans and the British owned factories in Ambriz 
in 1845 provides a solid indication of the international 
nature of the Ambriz trade.69
Both Cabinda and Ambriz offered extremely 
propitious conditions for the slave trade (Herlin, 2004, p. 
261-285). In the 1840s, for example, several barracoons 
to hold enslaved Africans existed fi ve miles inland from 
the coast of Ambriz.70 According to Portuguese and Brit-
ish authorities, “there were at that time several hundred 
slaves in barracoons near Ambriz ready for shipment”.71 
Furthermore, ships operating out of Ambriz and Cabinda 
could count on a local network of seasoned Cabindan 
sailors to help with the trade. In addition, Cabindans were 
deeply involved in the trade, either through slave trading 
or controlling coastal trade in northern Angola.72 Powerful 
Cabindan families held tight links not only with Luanda 
but also with Brazil, where they often sent their children 
to be educated (AHU, papéis de Sá da Bandeira, maço 
827. Documento de 23 de agosto de 1840). 
Conclusion
Although shipments of slaves in nineteenth-
century Angola were directly aff ected by external forces, 
such as international eff orts to suppress the slave trade 
and the tight economic links with Brazil, the supply of 
slaves for the coast and local politics were also key factors 
in the continuation of the trade during illegality. Exter-
nal forces - represented by partial abolition of the slave 
trade - aff ected fi rst northern Angola, and only much 
64 “Registro de Ofício do Governador de Angola” on June 18, 1825 (BML, cód. 44, ﬂ s. 99v.-100v.).
65 Indeed, seemingly aware of looming ﬁ scal losses, the Luanda administration unsuccessfully attempted to establish a ﬁ xed place for the trade to take place so that it could 
levy taxes on the business. See “Carta do Governador de Angola” on November 14, 1819 (AHNA, cód. 240, ﬂ . 128); “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on September 4, 1824 
(AHU, Angola, cx. 145).
66 AHU, cód. 1633. Arrival of enslaved Africans in the Americas provides further evidence of what seems to have been a more intense British trade. For example, while the TSTD 
indicates that 1,596 slaves from Ambriz arrived in the Americas in 1799, Luanda authorities claimed that the annual number of shipments by British ships was 6,000 slaves that 
year. See “Ofício para o Governador de Angola” on March 8, 1800 (AHNA, cód. 254, ﬂ s. 144-144v.).
67 “Relatório do Governador de Angola” on March 5, 1826 (AHU, Angola, cx. 151).
68 “Relatório do Comandante do Brigue Charybolis” on September 6, 1835 (AGM, cx. 311).
69 “Ofício de Joaquim Xavier Bressane Leite” on August 31, 1845 (AHNA, cód. 16, ﬂ s. 125v.-126).
70 “Portaria da Secretaria de Governo da Marinha e Ultramar” on April 27, 1844 (AHNA, cód. 261, ﬂ s. 145-145v.).
71 Draft of Letter by Palmerston on November 11, 1846 (PRO, FO 84, 630, 1846, ﬂ s. 99-101). See also “Ofício do Governador de Angola” on February 17, 1846 (AHU, segunda 
seção de Angola, pasta 10 A).
72 Dispatch by the British Representative in the Mixed Commission in Luanda on March 30, 1844 (FO 84, 517, 1844, ﬂ s. 40-41).
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The suppression of the slave trade and slave departures from Angola, 1830s-1860s
later took a toll on the trade in Luanda and Benguela. 
In Luanda and Benguela, Brazilian and local investors 
held tight grip over shipments of slaves, in addition to 
dominating local politics and crippling early attempts 
to ban the trade. It is not surprising, therefore, that slave 
trading continued until the mid-1840s. Th e geography of 
the northern Angolan coast and Congo River ensured an 
almost daunting number of potential slave-embarkation 
points and there was no local Portuguese administration 
present to either help or hinder shipments of slaves. Th e 
region thus provided a safe haven for slave dealers when 
pressure on the traffi  c built up in Luanda and Benguela.
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